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Synthesis, History, and the 
Example of Whitman 
 
      Russell Sbriglia 
 
For a fellow disciple of what, in my estimation, is the single most important tradition 
informing Todd McGowan’s Emancipation After Hegel, that of the Ljubljana School, 
many possible responses to the book present themselves. One could, for instance, 
point out all of the ways in which McGowan’s book constitutes what, to date, is the 
most ambitious attempt at articulating precisely the type of “Hegelian critique of 
Marx” that Slavoj Žižek long ago called for.1 Indeed, one need look no further than 
McGowan’s contention that Marx is a “rightist deviation” from Hegel – a reading sure 
to raise some eyebrows – to realize that Adrian Johnston’s claim that “McGowan 
forges an unprecedented type of Left Hegelianism” is in no way hyperbolic.2 Another 
potential avenue of response would be to point out all of the ways in which 
McGowan’s book constitutes what, to date, is the most subtle attempt at achieving 
another of Žižek’s career-long aims, that of “reactualiz[ing] Hegelian dialectics by 
giving it a new reading on the basis of Lacanian psychoanalysis.”3 I say “most subtle 
attempt” because though McGowan devotes an entire chapter to the topic of “Hegel 
After Freud” – a chapter in which he argues that Hegel came “almost a century too 
soon,” for it is only with the advent of Freud and psychoanalysis that we get an 
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adequate language for articulating the primary aim of the dialectic: namely, “to 
sustain and extend contradiction” – Lacan is conspicuously absent, yet nonetheless 
present, virtually nowhere, yet simultaneously everywhere, throughout the book, a 
(more or less) silent partner.4 Or, to give one final example, one could respond to the 
book by pointing out all of the ways in which the ontology of Hegel’s that McGowan 
lays out therein – an ontology according to which epistemological impasses and 
contradictions are not to be abandoned as precluding true ontological inquiry, but 
are instead to be viewed as symptoms of contradictions in being itself – offers a 
much needed corrective to the object-oriented ontologies underwriting the various 
new materialisms and realisms currently en vogue throughout the humanities and 
social sciences. Whereas these object-oriented ontologies are all marked by a desire 
to bypass the subject and return philosophy to the pre-Kantian aim of “thinking 
substance” as it is “in itself,” to regain, in the words of Quentin Meillassoux, access to 
“the great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers,” McGowan 
demonstrates with devastating clarity that, from the vantage point of Hegel’s 
ontology, insofar as substance is ineluctably also subject (i.e., non-self-identical, 
divided against itself), such a great outdoors, as Lacan says of the big Other, simply 
does not exist.5 
Tempting as all of these avenues are, however, in what follows I have opted to 
follow none of them. With respect to the first two, those familiar with the work of the 
Ljubljana School will no doubt be able to register for themselves the degree to which 
McGowan’s book not only draws upon Žižek and company’s approach to Hegel vis-
à-vis Marx and Lacan, but further radicalizes it. As for the third avenue, I have already 
said pretty much everything I have to say about the challenge that Hegel’s “broken 
ontology” (as McGowan elsewhere puts it) of subjectivized substance poses to 
object-oriented ontologies of the aforementioned sort.6 What I intend to do here is to 
pay careful consideration to how McGowan’s interpretation of Hegel as a thinker of 
radical emancipation at the same time radically emancipates Hegel himself from 
long-held misconceptions about and misprisions of his philosophy, not only by his 
detractors but even – perhaps especially – by his defenders. My means of so doing 
will be to focus on one particular figure in the long history of Hegel’s reception, a 
figure who was one of Hegel’s earliest, most enthusiastic champions in the United 
States: Walt Whitman.  
I have chosen Whitman as my focus not simply because, as McGowan himself 
notes, with the exception of Hegel, he is arguably the most iconic thinker of 
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contradiction in the nineteenth century, but also, and more importantly, because his 
understanding of and engagement with Hegel throughout his later poetry and prose 
illustrates two of the main “catastrophes,” as McGowan characterizes them, from 
which Hegel’s thought has long suffered: (1) the view that the dialectic can be 
understood by way of the model “thesis-antithesis-synthesis,” a view whose primary 
effect has been the miscasting of Hegel as above all else a prophet of synthesis; and 
(2) the central role that the Philosophy of History has played in the dissemination of 
his thought, a role whose primary effect has been the miscasting of Hegel as a 
teleologist whose notion of the “end of history” is deemed part and parcel of an 
unwavering belief in a utopian overcoming of political contradictions – indeed, of the 
very political itself. Though my approach throughout will necessarily be less 
theoretical than historical (though by no means historicist), it is my hope that such an 
approach will help to corroborate some of the fundamental claims of McGowan’s 
book while simultaneously helping to further clear the ground for future theoretical 
work on Hegel (especially in my own field of nineteenth-century American literary 
studies) – theoretical work upon which it will be difficult to avoid bringing McGowan’s 
book to bear.  
 
Non-Synthetic Hegel, or, Absolute Contradiction 
 Allow me to begin this section with a brief personal anecdote – one that will 
help to illustrate just how crucial an intervention into the field of Hegel studies 
McGowan’s book truly is. A few months ago, while sharing a drink with friends 
following the conclusion of the day’s panels at this year’s LACK Conference, my 
phone began the proverbial process of “blowing up.”7 In the first of many text 
messages and emails I would receive over the next two weeks regarding the matter, 
one of my colleagues in the English Department at Seton Hall University texted me a 
screenshot of a passage from the latest entry in the ever growing “quit lit” genre, an 
article by Andrew Kay in the Chronicle of Higher Education titled “Academe’s 
Extinction Event: Failure, Whiskey, and Professional Collapse at the MLA.”8 The article 
is a by and large cynical narrative of Kay’s experiences while attending the annual 
MLA Convention in Chicago, Illinois this past January after having decided to leave 
the academy nearly three years ago as a result of its beyond dismal job market. The 
passage from the essay that my colleague (later several colleagues) sent me was 
the following one:  
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I woke the next morning with a hangover. I looked at my phone: it was 
the three-year anniversary of my finished dissertation. . . . I showered, 
dressed, and headed to the elevator, where a young man from Seton 
Hall University effused to a peer: “If you practice the dialectic in the 
antinomian way that Adorno lays out, then you can’t achieve the 
synthesis Hegel envisions.” I stared straight ahead.9 
 
The anonymous “young man” in this passage is me. I did indeed take an elevator ride 
with a peer (a fellow English professor at Seton Hall, though not the one who sent 
me the initial text), the short duration of which was in fact spent discussing Hegel.10 
Funny as it is, however, Kay’s recounting of what I said on that elevator ride couldn’t 
be more inaccurate, for though (in the interest of full disclosure) I can’t remember 
exactly what I said, I am certain that I did not say this – not only because I don’t 
believe I’ve ever uttered the word “antinomian” aloud before, but also, and more 
importantly, because, like McGowan, I insist that Hegel’s dialectic in no way rests on 
a vision of synthesis. Of course, the target of Kay’s parody is neither Hegel nor his 
dialectic (synthetic or otherwise) but rather, as Micah Mattix points out, “the language 
English professors have adopted over the past fifty years.”11 And yet, that Kay can 
confidently rely on the trope of Hegel as a prophet of synthesis to serve as the 
vehicle for his jab at academic-speak illustrates just how universally shared such a 
view of Hegel is.  
 Ironically enough, the person I happened to be sitting next to when I received 
this first of many messages regarding my (not so) anonymous appearance in Kay’s 
article as a champion of Hegelian synthesis was Todd McGowan, who opens the 
first chapter of Emancipation After Hegel, “The Path to Contradiction,” by confronting 
head-on the accepted wisdom, even among many Hegelians, that the dialectic can 
be understood by way of “the mantra ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis.’” As McGowan 
explains, though Hegel “never employs these terms to describe his philosophy” – 
indeed, he even “implicitly criticizes this way of organizing the movement of his 
thought” – because the dialectic “often seems to move from a one-sided claim to an 
opposing one-sided claim to a third claim that addresses the shortcomings of both,” 
an “image of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis takes hold.”12 On the one hand, such an 
image is appealing, for it not only “make[s] the notoriously difficult Hegel easier to 
understand,” but also “provides a comforting image of how conflicts and 
contradictions end up working out.” On the other hand, it makes Hegel an easy 
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target for those who would like to paint him as a thinker who “believes in tidy and 
necessarily progressive resolutions of oppositions in a universe that constantly gives 
the lie to this verdict,” a “bright-eyed optimist incapable of registering the unresolved 
messiness of real life.”13  
Though not the first to critique the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model of 
understanding the dialectic, McGowan’s approach to so doing is unique in that it 
rests on demonstrating that this model isn’t one of contradiction at all but, rather, one 
of “mere opposition.”14 As the impetus behind McGowan’s reading of Hegel is 
ultimately political (how could a book with both “emancipation” and “revolution” in its 
title not be?), perhaps an example from the realm of political theory will best serve to 
illustrate the distinction he draws between contradiction and opposition. The most 
iconic instance of oppositional thinking in political theory over the past century is Carl 
Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” model of the political. According to Schmitt, the distinction 
between friend and enemy is the necessary “criterion” for the political as such insofar 
as it is the “distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced.”15 As he 
puts it in The Concept of the Political, “a world without the distinction of friend and 
enemy” would, perforce, be “a world without politics,” for “the political can be 
understood only in the context of the ever present possibility of the friend-and-enemy 
grouping.”16 In contrast to this oppositional model (wherein “friend” plays the role of 
thesis while “enemy” plays the role of antithesis), Hegelian contradiction, McGowan 
contends, entails “not the assertion of a thesis and a contrary antithesis,” but rather 
grasping the inability of any thesis to be “stable” or “self-identical” in its own right – 
the inability, as Hegel would put it, of any thesis to be “substantial.”17 Contradiction is 
for Hegel not the process whereby a thesis encounters an external obstacle or 
“enemy,” but the process whereby, “follow[ing] its own logic,” a thesis “thereby finds 
itself at odds with itself,” “undermines itself by exposing its own internal division.”18 
Whereas opposition is premised upon a relation of externality, contradiction, 
understood as “the inability of anything to be identical with itself,” is premised upon a 
relation of internality.19 In short, in order for a given conflict to be truly contradictory 
rather than merely oppositional, it must be an immanent one.  
The immanence of contradiction is the fundamental lesson behind such 
classic Hegelian notions as “tarrying with the negative,” the “night of the world,” and 
the “cunning of reason,” all of which encapsulate McGowan’s point that for Hegel “a 
thesis is never an isolated starting point that subsequently confronts an antithesis.” 
On the contrary, because a thesis “always generates its own contradiction,” it is “at 
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odds with itself on the basis of its own articulation, not through the emergence of an 
antithesis that responds with a counterpoint.” From this it follows that not only is 
there “no isolated thesis for Hegel,” but so too is there “no external opposing 
antithesis.”20  
So why, then, does this image of the Hegelian dialectic as a battle between 
thesis and antithesis continue to hold so much sway? McGowan’s answer is 
ideology. As he asserts, “When opponents of Hegel transform this internal division 
into the opposition of thesis and antithesis, they make his philosophy an easier target 
while at the same time performing the fundamental ideological gesture that this 
philosophy tries to combat.”21 Marx, of whom McGowan is deeply critical in the book, 
famously theorized ideology as “false consciousness,” a phenomenon best 
encapsulated by the line, “They do not know it, but they are doing it.”22 Yet whereas 
Marx’s definition of ideology rests on the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat (for it is the bourgeoisie that, by way of various mystificatory 
processes, causes the proletariat to misperceive social reality, to see it “upside-down, 
as in a camera obscura ,” as Marx famously put it in The German Ideology ), for 
McGowan, following Žižek, ideology is the transposition of an immanent antagonism 
into an external one – the transposition, in short, of contradiction into opposition.23  
Having already mentioned Schmitt, a man once infamously crowned the 
“Crown Jurist” of the Third Reich, it is perhaps worth illustrating this point by way of 
the phenomenon that Žižek often characterizes as the “zero-level” of ideology, 
“ideology as such”: anti-Semitism.24 As Žižek explains, what happens in anti-Semitism 
is that an inherent social antagonism is projected onto an Other, the “Jew,” who is 
thereby transposed into “a foreign intruder who stands for the threat to society as 
such, for the antisocial element, for its excremental excess.” Such a process 
establishes the “elementary coordinates” of ideology insofar as it takes an immanent 
antagonism, one inherent to a given social order, and “mystifie[s] or displace[s it] so 
that its cause can be projected onto [an] external intruder.”25 Hence Žižek’s 
conclusion that “the real ‘secret’ of the Jew is our own antagonism”: “the fascinating 
image of the [Jew] gives a body to our own innermost split, to what is ‘in us more 
than ourselves’ and thus prevents us from achieving full identity with ourselves.” In 
short, “The hatred of the [Jew] is the hatred of our own excess.”26  
To return to McGowan, this is why he insists that “the popular reading of Hegel 
that imagines contradiction in terms of antithesis” not only “thoroughly betrays his 
radicality,” but also (and more nefariously) allows us to cling to “the figure of the 
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enemy who serves as a foil for our identity” rather than confronting the fact that our 
identity is itself non-identical, riven from within.27 Insofar as he “systematically 
uncovers contradiction lurking within opposition,” thereby “enabl[ing] us to see that 
oppositions are really just contradictions in disguise” and that “those we imagine as 
enemies most often turn out to be versions of ourselves,” it is Hegel, not Marx, who 
should be considered the father of modern ideology critique.28 
And yet, to recall Kay’s quip about Hegelian synthesis, as McGowan stresses, it 
is with this third term in the faux-Hegelian triad that “the problem begins in earnest,” 
for though synthesis is “the term most popularly associated with Hegel,” it is at the 
same time the term “most alien to his philosophy.” To quote McGowan at length: 
 
[T]he movement that results from contradiction is not a synthetic one. 
What Hegel calls the resolution (Auflösung) of contradiction is not its 
elimination through a third term, as the idea of synthesis suggests. 
Instead, it is the reconciliation (Versöhnung) with contradiction, the 
recognition that contradiction is not a problem to be eliminated but the 
driving force of all movement in being. One cannot arrive at a synthesis 
that would eliminate contradiction because contradiction is the basic 
fact of all being. This is the heart of Hegel’s philosophy, which the 
formula “thesis, antithesis, synthesis” utterly betrays.29  
 
From this perspective, the movement of the dialectic isn’t, as Hegel defenders (like 
Robert Pippen) and detractors (like Karl Popper) alike believe, “a progressive one” (at 
least not in the typical sense of the term “progressive”), for rather than “creating an 
increasingly secure position for himself through the conquest of successive 
contradictions,” as the synthetic/progressive model suggests, Hegel instead “serially 
tear[s] away from the possibilities for escaping contradiction.”30 Though there is 
indeed what Hegel calls “unity” (Einheit) at the end of each dialectical process, this 
unity “does not do away with contradiction but enacts a reconciliation with it.”31 
Here we come upon a problem akin to that of the confusion between 
contradiction and opposition discussed above. Whereas reconciliation (Versöhnung) 
is often understood throughout Hegel studies as interchangeable with synthesis (the 
latter of which, as McGowan notes, never appears in Hegel – at least not in the sense 
of the result of a merger between a thesis and its antithesis), Hegel uses 
reconciliation to mean not the “overcoming” of contradiction by way of a fusion 
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between two opposing theses, but rather the recognition of contradiction’s 
recalcitrance. Reconciliation for Hegel entails not the sublation (Aufhebung) of 
contradiction, but recognizing contradiction’s “intractability.”32 Rather than referring to 
some mystical process performed by the dialectic itself, reconciliation refers to an act 
of recognition on the part of the subject. This is why McGowan continually uses 
phrases such as “reconciling ourselves with” or “being reconciled to” contradiction 
throughout the book.33 And it is precisely this act of reconciling ourselves to 
contradiction that for McGowan constitutes the core of what Hegel calls the 
“absolute.” 
 According to McGowan, the dialectic advances toward the absolute not by 
resolving contradictions via ever more complex syntheses, but by moving “from 
simple contradictions to contradictions that more and more resist resolution.” We 
reach the apogee of the dialectical process – “absolute knowing” in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit and the “absolute idea” in the Science of Logic – when we 
arrive at a contradiction that is utterly recalcitrant, “a contradiction that we cannot 
overcome but must reconcile ourselves to.”34 What Hegel calls the “absolute” is thus 
“nothing but the affirmation that contradiction is unsurpassable. At the position of the 
absolute, we recognize that we cannot ever eliminate contradiction, no matter how 
long or how hard we strive to do so.”35 As Stanley Cavell might put it, contrary to its 
typical caricature as a pretension on Hegel’s part to know or to think absolutely 
everything, up to and including a preternatural ability to “read the mind of God” and 
thereby “deduce all of reality out of the self-movement of (his) Mind,” the Hegelian 
absolute rests not upon knowledge but, rather, an “acknowledgment” of 
contradiction’s intractability.36 And Hegel’s acknowledgement of contradiction’s 
intractability, its absoluteness, is precisely what the view of him as a thinker of 
synthesis absolutely prevents us from acknowledging.  
 
With Friends Like These . . . , or, Whitman’s Synthetic Hegel 
That contradiction is for Hegel absolute is why he ultimately ended up rejecting the 
principle of noncontradiction – a principle, as McGowan stresses, that underwrites 
virtually all of Western philosophy.37 In “The Difficulties of Contradicting Oneself,” the 
final section of the book’s opening chapter, McGowan turns to the self-professed 
poet of contradiction, Walt Whitman, as a means of placing Hegel’s unique method 
of rejecting this cherished principle in greater relief. As the section’s title suggests, the 
lines of Whitman’s in which McGowan is primarily interested are the following iconic 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







ones from Section 51 of “Song of Myself”: “Do I contradict myself? / Very well then, I 
contradict myself, / (I am large, I contain multitudes).”38 As McGowan has it, in these 
few brief lines, Whitman not only “articulate[s] Hegel’s opposition to the principle of 
noncontradiction,” he also does so in a way that, unlike Hegel’s prose, “few readers 
struggle to make sense of.” And yet, McGowan maintains that from a properly 
Hegelian perspective, Whitman’s straightforwardness is precisely the problem, for to 
either “simply abandon the principle of noncontradiction and contradict oneself” or 
“straightforwardly announce in a noncontradictory fashion that contradiction exists” 
is to “implicitly accept the very principle [Hegel] shows to be untenable.” Though 
directly rejecting the principle of noncontradiction makes for greater “lucidity” (not to 
mention a more “compelling poem”), such an “unambiguous embrace of 
contradiction would be untenable for Hegel as a philosopher” insofar as the “trick” of 
his dialectical method is to “embrace the principle of noncontradiction in order to 
show that it ultimately does not hold.”39  
If Hegel, however, doesn’t go about pulling off this trick poetically, he 
nonetheless does so dramatically, for, as McGowan contends, “the logic of the 
movement in Hegel’s works is one of the dramatizing of a position in order to make 
its contradiction apparent.” Hegel can neither simply embrace contradiction nor 
openly reject the principle of noncontradiction because “in the drama that his 
philosophy unleashes, every position reveals its own undoing, exhibiting that rather 
than being self-identical it is at odds with itself. Dramatization exposes each position 
to its own crisis.”40 As a student of nineteenth-century American literature might put it, 
though Hegel, as McGowan asserts, “cannot be Walt Whitman,” he can nonetheless 
be Edgar Allan Poe, a thinker who, like Hegel, most effectively rejected favored 
principles not by openly renouncing them, but by taking them up and parasitizing 
them, undermining them from within by following their logics to their contradictory 
ends. Indeed, to follow the logic of this particular thought to its end, if the dialectic is 
a drama, then Hegel, its stage manager, is an “imp of the perverse.”41  
McGowan concludes his remarks on Whitman by noting that “even though he 
embraces Hegel as a primary inspiration, [his] Hegelianism offers tacit support to the 
maxim that the greatest threat to a thinker are acolytes rather than enemies.”42 
Though I agree with McGowan that Whitman illustrates the truth of this maxim, it is 
not “Song of Myself” that best does so. While Whitman did indeed full-throatedly 
endorse Hegel as a primary inspiration, at one point proclaiming that “Only Hegel is 
fit for America – is large enough and free enough,” and esteeming him “Humanity’s 
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chiefest teacher and the choicest loved physician of my mind and soul,” what is most 
interesting about McGowan’s attribution of the aforementioned lines from “Song of 
Myself” to Whitman’s Hegelianism is that these lines were actually written before 
Whitman’s definitive encounter with Hegel – an encounter, as a number of critics 
have discussed, that had a major influence on his later poetry and prose.43 In fact, 
from the perspective of McGowan’s Hegel, “Song of Myself” represents Whitman at 
his most Hegelian, a point that illustrates the other side of McGowan’s 
aforementioned maxim: namely, that the greatest acolytes of a given thinker are 
often unconscious ones.44 
Though he likely knew of Hegel at the time of his initial drafting of “Song of 
Myself” in the mid-1850s, Whitman’s true discovery of Hegel by all accounts didn’t 
occur until the 1860s.45 As Whitman biographer David Reynolds notes, Whitman’s 
friend F. S. Gray gifted him a copy of Frederic Henry Hedge’s popular 1848 anthology 
Prose Writers of Germany in August of 1862.46 One of the founding members of the 
Transcendentalist Club (which was originally dubbed “Hedge’s Club” because it 
typical convened whenever he came down to Cambridge, Massachusetts from 
Bangor, Maine, where he held a Unitarian pastorate), Hedge, though Boston-born, 
studied in Germany between the ages of thirteen and seventeen (1818–1821), during 
which time he is said to have read Kant’s Critiques in the original German as well as 
works by the other German Idealists. He would go on to become a professor of 
German at Harvard.47  
Among other notable German intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries – including Hamann, Herder, Goethe, Jacobi, Lavater, Lessing, Novalis, 
Schiller, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher – Hedge’s Prose Writers of Germany features 
English translations of selections from all four major German Idealists, including 
excerpts from over a dozen of Kant’s texts (particularly his writings on aesthetics), 
Fichte’s The Destination of Man, Schelling’s Philosophy of Art, and Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History and “Who Thinks Abstractly?” Though fluent in academic 
German, Hedge, in the book’s preface, attributes the translations of Kant and 
Schelling to fellow transcendentalist (and eventual Emerson biographer) James 
Elliot Cabot, while the translations of Hegel he attributes to “an anonymous friend 
possessing peculiar qualifications for that difficult task”—a friend identified by Loyd 
Easton as Henry Boynton Smith, who had not only studied in Germany (as had 
Hedge), but who, while there, had also struck up a friendship with Hegel’s widow.48 
The anonymous Smith is likewise credited with having written the brief introduction 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







to Hegel that precedes the excerpts from the Philosophy of History. Especially 
relevant to our discussion is the following passage from this introduction:  
 
His philosophy claims to be the absolute system, the result and 
culmination of all other systems. In it he resumes the whole progress of 
the human mind, and alleges that his system, and that alone, is able to 
explain the whole course of history, all the phenomena of nature, all the 
problems of speculation. There is one Absolute Substance pervading all 
things. That Substance is Spirit. This Spirit is endued with the power of 
development; it produces itself the opposing powers and forces of the 
universe. All that we have to do is to stand by and see the process going 
on. The process is at first the evolution of antagonistic forces; then a 
mediation between them. All proceeds by triplicates; there is the 
positive, then the negative, then the mediation between them, which 
produces a higher unity. This again is but the starting point for a new 
series. And so the process goes on, from stage to stage, until the 
Absolute Spirit has passed through all the stadia of its evolutions, and is 
exhibited in its highest form in the Hegelian system of philosophy.49  
 
From the standpoint of McGowan’s Hegel, there are a number of problems with this 
passage. For starters, there is the problem of Smith’s casting of Spirit as absolutely 
substantial, as the “one Absolute Substance.” Though Smith claims that Spirit 
“produces itself the opposing powers and forces of the universe,” this Spirit is 
ultimately one of pure positivity, pure “development.” Smith gives no indication that 
Spirit, too, is riven by contradiction, that Spirit, as Hegel famously puts it in the 
preface to the Phenomenology, “finds itself” only by way of its “utter 
dismemberment,” becomes Spirit only by “looking the negative in the face, and 
tarrying with it,” a negativity whose “power is identical with . . . the Subject.”50 As 
regards our present discussion, however, an even more elementary problem with 
this passage is its perpetuation of the “thesis-antithesis-synthesis” model of the 
dialectic. Though the exact terms themselves are absent, everything else from this 
model is here, as Smith presents Spirit as unfolding triadically, with “positive” (thesis) 
clashing with “negative” (antithesis) and the “mediation” between the two generating 
a “higher unity” (synthesis). 
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Whitman wasn’t merely influenced by Hedge’s book, he also cribbed from it.51 
Consider, for instance, the following passage from Whitman’s “Sunday Evening 
Lectures,” a series of unpublished lecture notes on the German Idealists written at 
some point during the late-1860s or early-1870s:  
 
Penetrating beneath the shows and materials of the objective world we 
find, according to Hegel . . . that in respect to human cognition of them, 
all and several are pervaded by the only absolute substance which is 
SPIRIT, endued with the eternal impetus of development, and producing 
from itself the opposing powers and forces of the universe. A curious, 
triplicate process seems the resultant action; first the Positive, then the 
Negative, then the product of the mediation between them; from which 
product the process is repeated and so goes on without end. In his 
Introduction to the Philosophy of History, this is illustrated in the portion 
on “History as a manifestation of Spirit.”52 
 
The influence of Hedge’s book is unmistakable here, as Whitman reproduces nearly 
verbatim the language Smith uses to describe both Spirit (“absolute substance,” 
“endued with the eternal impetus of development,” “producing from itself the 
opposing powers and forces of the universe”) and the “process” of Spirit’s unfolding 
(“triplicate,” “Positive,” “Negative,” “mediation”). What’s more, among the excerpts 
from the introduction to the Philosophy of History included in Hedge’s collection 
(excerpts about which we will have more to say below) is a section titled “History as 
the Manifestation of Spirit.”53 
 Another well-documented source upon which Whitman relied for his 
knowledge of Hegel was British author Joseph Gostwick’s 1849 textbook German 
Literature.54 Though Gostwick likewise refrains from using the terms thesis, antithesis, 
and synthesis to characterize the dialectic, in his remarks on Hegel he too casts him 
as above all else a synthesizer, a resolver of contradictions. Consider, for instance, 
the following passage: 
 
Kant explained the laws of the understanding. But are these laws 
accordant with external truth or reality? . . . Hegel professes to solve the . 
. . question (left open by Kant) . . . by a method of thought which he 
styles ‘absolute logic;’ a process of reason which (as he shows) is found 
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not only in the human mind, but throughout external nature. The 
heavens and the earth, and all things within their compass, all the 
events of history, the facts of the present, and the developments of the 
future, must be (according to Hegel’s doctrine) only so many steps in 
one eternal process of creative thought. The leading principle of this 
process is found in the development of a series of oppositions which 
are at once produced and resolved by reason. Truth is represented as 
consisting in the just ‘relation’ of objects to each other. Unity pervading 
apparent opposition, and variety, is the mark of truth in all systems, both 
natural and intellectual.55  
 
While these comments reflect a somewhat more nuanced understanding of the 
dialectic than that of Smith, Gostwick nonetheless frames the dialectic as a process 
of “eternal” progression. Not only does he take “unity” to mean reason’s resolution of 
contradictions as opposed to its reconciliation of them, but he also holds that all 
contradictions are merely “apparent,” a point he reiterates a few pages later when he 
claims that Hegel treats “all the oppositions or apparent contradictions found in the 
world of thought, as also in the external world, . . . with regard to the essential unity 
from which they proceed.”56  
Though Whitman briefly quotes from German Literature in the “Sunday 
Evening Lectures,” it is his 1882 essay “Carlyle from an American Point of View” that 
reveals the full extent of his debt to Gostwick.57 As is the case with Hedge’s book in 
the “Lectures,” Whitman in this essay doesn’t merely adopt Gostwick’s language, but 
also appropriates a number of passages from German Literature (especially the ones 
we’ve been looking at) nearly verbatim. The following passage is exemplary in this 
regard: 
 
According to Hegel the whole earth . . . with all its infinite variety, the 
past, the surroundings of to-day, or what may happen in the future, the 
contraries of material with spiritual, and of natural with artificial, are all, 
to the eye of the emsemblist, but necessary sides and unfoldings, 
different steps or links, in the endless process of Creative thought, 
which, amid numberless apparent failures and contradictions, is held 
together by central and never-broken unity – not contradictions or 
failures at all, but radiations of one consistent and eternal purpose; the 
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whole mass of everything steadily, unerringly tending and flowing 
toward the permanent utile and morale, as rivers to oceans. . . . Truth 
consists in the just relations of objects to each other. . . . All apparent 
contradictions in the statement of the Deific nature by different ages, 
nations, churches, points of view, are but fractional and imperfect 
expressions of one essential unity, from which they all proceed.58 
 
While a line such as “Truth consists in the just relations of objects to each other” is 
useful to note, for it illustrates the degree to which Whitman’s purported “recounting” 
of Hegel, however “freely,” is really just a recapitulation of secondary sources like 
Gostwick and Hedge, of far greater importance are the lines in which he reiterates 
Gostwick’s contention that, ultimately, contradictions for Hegel are merely “apparent,” 
“not contradictions . . . at all.”59 Following Gostwick’s lead, there are, so far as 
Whitman’s Hegel is concerned, no contradictions that reason or spirit cannot 
ultimately overcome because, as it turns out, there are no true contradictions, just 
“fractional and imperfect expressions of one essential unity.”  
 It is precisely this triumphal understanding of the Hegelian dialectic that we 
find in a brief poem of Whitman’s written around the same time as the Carlyle essay, 
1881’s “Roaming in Thought (After reading HEGEL)”:  
 
Roaming in thought over the Universe, I saw the little that is Good steadily 
 hastening towards immortality, 
 And the vast all that is call’d Evil I saw hastening to merge itself and  
  become lost and dead.60 
 
In their editorial notes to this poem for the Norton Critical Edition of Leaves of Grass, 
Sculley Bradley and Harold Blodgett, upon pointing out that Whitman “felt that his 
own idealism was affirmed by Hegel’s,” assert that the dialectic (which, tellingly, they 
characterize via the formula “thesis, antithesis, synthesis”) is “essentially illustrated by 
these lines.”61 Yet, while Whitman does indeed cast Good and Evil as thesis and 
antithesis in the poem, he doesn’t introduce a third term to occupy the crucial 
position of synthesis. Indeed, it would seem that what we are left with at the poem’s 
end is not some new entity, a hybrid of Good and Evil, but rather Good alone. 
Moreover, it’s not altogether clear with what Evil actually merges in the poem. When 
Whitman says that Evil is “hastening to merge / itself,” does he mean us to 
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understand that Evil is hastening to merge itself with Good, in which case Good 
would be responsible for having vanquished Evil, or are we instead to take the “itself” 
to mean that this merger occurs solely amongst Evil, that Evil vanquishes itself in a 
process entirely separate from the Good? Whatever the case, as in the Carlyle essay, 
there is simply no place here for what McGowan terms “the constitutive status of 
contradiction” for Hegel, no sense that the Hegelian absolute “involves the 
recognition of the constitutive necessity of” contradiction.62 By the poem’s end, Evil is 
left for “dead,” while Good is assured of achieving “immortality.”  
As noted earlier, McGowan points out that a primary reason for the persistence 
of the thesis-antithesis-synthesis model of the dialectic is that it “provides a 
comforting image of how conflicts and contradictions end up working out.” For a 
number of Whitman’s commentators, it is precisely this understanding of Hegel as a 
“bright-eyed optimist,” a thinker who offers “tidy and necessarily progressive 
resolutions of oppositions,” that so attracted the poet to him. As the aforementioned 
David Reynolds argues, Whitman found in Hegel the “philosophical consolation” he 
so desperately needed in the wake of the Civil War, the bloody carnage of which he 
witnessed firsthand while serving as a volunteer nurse for the Union Army.63 Invoking 
one of the iconic lines from “Song of Myself” likewise invoked by McGowan, Reynolds 
contends that: 
 
With slight rewriting, we could say that by the late [eighteen] sixties 
America was too “large” for Whitman, who now looked to the Hegelian 
dialectic for solutions to cultural problems which his poetic “I” – itself 
once “large” and “containing multitudes” – had formerly tried to solve. 
Hegel’s formula of thesis-antithesis-synthesis brought great consolation 
to Whitman. It suggested that, no matter what, things would work out in 
time.64  
 
As Reynolds concludes, in contrast to Kant’s “subjectivism” – a subjectivism that 
“ultimately made Emersonian Transcendentalism distasteful to” Whitman as well – 
the “synthetic idealism” of Hegel, “the all-resolving philosopher,” “accorded with 
Whitman’s jingoism,” leaving him “more confident than before” that the “problems” of 
postbellum America “would disappear with time.”65 
Reynolds is far from alone in painting Hegel as Whitman’s philosophical 
panacea. For instance, in her discussion of Whitman’s 1871 political pamphlet 
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Democratic Vistas, Betsy Erkkila claims that, “In his attempt to reconcile the ideals of 
democracy with the carnage of the war and the corruptions of post-Civil War 
America, Whitman found philosophical support in the ideas of Hegel and the 
German idealistic thinkers,” adding that “Hegel’s idea of a triplicate process through 
which opposites are merged into a higher synthesis, and his vision of history as a 
manifestation of spirit, rationalized Whitman’s own vision of American democracy 
progressing through the evils and contradictions of the present toward divine ends.”66 
One even finds such a view among philosophers. Reflecting on the affinity between 
Whitman’s and Hegel’s thought, Richard Rorty, in an oft-anthologized essay, asserts 
that  
 
Whitman, like Hegel, . . . wanted competition and argument between 
alternative forms of human life – a poetic agon, in which jarring 
dialectical discords would be resolved in previously unheard harmonies. 
The Hegelian idea of “progressive evolution,” which was the nineteenth 
century’s great contribution to political and social thought, is that 
everybody gets played off against everybody else. This should occur 
nonviolently if possible, but violently if necessary, as was in fact 
necessary in America in 1861. The Hegelian hope is that the result of 
such struggles will be a new culture, better than any of those of which it 
is the synthesis. This new culture will be better because it will contain 
more variety in unity – it will be a tapestry in which more strands have 
been woven together. But this tapestry, too, will eventually have to be 
torn to shreds in order that a larger one may be woven,  
in order that the past may not obstruct the future.67 
 
It is one thing for literary critics like Reynolds and Erkkila to rehearse the “thesis-
antithesis-synthesis” mantra and to characterize Hegel as an “all-resolving 
philosopher.”68 Not only is their primary focus Whitman rather than Hegel, but, as we 
have seen, their accounts of Whitman’s understanding of and engagement with 
Hegel are altogether accurate.69 It is quite another thing, however, for a philosopher 
like Rorty to accept uncritically and thereby help to perpetuate the view of Hegel as a 
thinker of harmony, synthesis, resolution, and progressive evolution. And yet, who 
better than a philosopher – not to mention one of the most revered American 
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philosophers in recent memory – to illustrate just how pervasive and persistent is the 
“catastrophic” view of Hegel as a prophet of synthesis?  
But Rorty’s discussion of Hegel’s influence on Whitman doesn’t end here, as he 
goes on to note that “Hegel’s philosophy of history legitimized and underwrote 
Whitman’s hope to substitute his own nation-state for the Kingdom of God.”70 Rorty 
here steers us toward another of the posthumous catastrophes McGowan identifies 
as having befallen Hegel’s philosophy, one that likewise drew Whitman to Hegel: the 
central position that the Philosophy of History has played in the dissemination of his 
thought. We will examine both the nationalistic and imperialistic purposes to which 
Whitman put Hegel’s philosophy of history below. In order to demonstrate just how 
far afield from Hegel’s own philosophy of history Whitman’s pseudo-Hegelian version 
is, however, we must first consider McGowan’s attempt at correcting this second 
catastrophe. 
 
Non-Substantial Hegel, or, Freedom as the End of History 
McGowan begins his book’s seventh chapter by asserting that “the most 
unfortunate development in the dissemination of Hegel’s thought after his death was 
the central role that his lectures on the Philosophy of History played in this 
dissemination.” Though based largely on transcriptions of Hegel’s lecture notes, as 
well as notes from students who attended the lectures, this posthumously published 
work, McGowan laments, “came to define the popular image of Hegel.” Indeed, for 
most non-specialists, the Philosophy of History constitutes “the beginning and end of 
the Hegel canon.”71 While this is still largely true today, it was even truer during 
Whitman’s era. Aside from the short essay “Who Thinks Abstractly?,” the brief 
selections from the Philosophy of History included in Hedge’s anthology were the 
only writings of Hegel’s to which most Americans, even learned ones, would have 
had access until the late-nineteenth/early twentieth century.72  
As McGowan explains, though as a general rule “there is no bad choice when 
one begins to read Hegel for the first time,” for each of his major works “has a 
legitimate claim to serving as an introduction to the entire system,” the exception to 
this rule is the Philosophy of History.73 In addition to the fact that Hegel didn’t himself 
prepare the lectures for publication, two other, more pressing problems present 
themselves. In the first place, throughout the lectures, “dialectics has only a 
peripheral role relative to the description of various societies and their development 
of freedom.” Whereas “each of Hegel’s other major works rehearses in some way his 
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dialectical system while introducing the subject matter,” be that subject matter logic, 
philosophy, religion, or politics, “the Philosophy of History does not.”74 In the second 
place, many of the key terms that Hegel uses throughout the text, such as “world-
historical individual,” “exist nowhere else in Hegel’s philosophy.” And yet, such terms, 
“along with other clichés from this work (like Hegel’s dismissal of the importance of 
the individual in history),” are nonetheless “often the only references to Hegel that 
many people have at their disposal.”75 Indeed, as McGowan correctly concludes, 
many people – especially those largely unfamiliar with the rest of Hegel’s work – hold 
the false impression that the Philosophy of History is Hegel’s “key text,” one that 
serves as a “shorthand for [his] entire philosophy.”76 
McGowan makes a convincing case for supplementing the Philosophy of 
History not with the Phenomenology of Spirit, as Alexandre Kojève (in)famously did, 
but with the Science of Logic.77 As he argues, “though Hegel himself never says as 
much,” properly understanding the Philosophy of History, especially the notion of 
freedom discussed therein, requires first reading the Science of Logic. To read the 
Philosophy of History before having navigated “the minefield of Hegel’s most difficult 
work” – a work in which he defines freedom (in McGowan’s words) as “the refusal to 
endow the Other with wholeness or self-consistency,” “the refusal to treat the Other 
as a substantial being” – is to be misled into thinking that the Philosophy of History 
“present[s] a triumphant image of progress that leads inexorably to the Europe of 
Hegel’s time without any consideration of those sacrificed for the sake of this 
progress.”78 
 This triumphant image of progress and the attendant dismissal of those world-
historical individuals sacrificed for the sake of this progress is precisely that which 
the excerpts from the Philosophy of History featured in Hedge’s anthology help to 
paint. Of all the famous passages from the Philosophy of History – including those in 
which Hegel proclaims that “Europe is absolutely the end of History” and that 
“America is therefore the land of the future” (both of which we will discuss shortly) – 
the only one included in Hedge’s excerpts is the following one regarding the cunning 
of reason (with cunning [List ] here translated by Smith as “craft”):  
 
In the history of the world something else is generally brought out by 
means of the actions of individual men than they themselves aim at or 
attain, than they directly know of or will; they achieve their own ends, but 
something farther is brought to pass in connection with their acts, which 
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also lies therein, but which did not lie in their consciousness and 
purposes. . . . 
. . . Caesar fought to maintain his own position, honor, and safety, 
and the victory over his opponents was at the same time the conquest 
of the whole kingdom: and thus he became, leaving only the forms of 
the constitution of the State, the sole possessor of power. The carrying 
out of his own at first negative purpose got for him the supremacy in 
Rome; but this was also in its true nature a necessary element in the 
history of Rome and of the world, so that it was not his own private gain 
merely, but an instinct which consummated that which, considered by 
itself, lay in the times themselves. Such are the great men of history – 
those whose private purposes contain the substance of that which is 
the will of the spirit of the world. This substance constitutes their real 
power; it is contained in the general and unconscious instinct of men; 
they are inwardly impelled thereto, and have no ground on which they 
can stand in opposing the man who has undertaken the execution of 
such a purpose in his own interest. . . . 
Should we, farther, cast a look at the fate of these world-historical 
individuals, we see that they have had the fortune to be the leaders to a 
consummation which marks a stage in the progress of the general 
mind. That reason makes use of these instruments we might call its 
craft; for it lets them carry out their own aims with all the rage of 
passion, and not only keeps itself unharmed, but makes itself dominant. 
The particular is for the most part too feeble against the universal; the 
individuals are sacrificed.79 
 
Though Smith, in the brief introductory remarks on Hegel that accompany his 
translation of these excerpts from the Philosophy of History, doesn’t comment on this 
passage, Gostwick surely has it in mind when he claims that history is for Hegel “a 
progressive enunciation of truth through a series of imperfect interpreters. Through 
all the errors of all times the process of truth may be traced. Individuals and 
communities, and even nations, may fall as sacrifices to this error; but even this error 
is a part of the process by which truth reveals itself.”80 For McGowan, it is precisely 
claims like this – claims according to which Hegel’s position is that individuals, 
communities, and even entire countries are ruthlessly “sacrificed” for the sake of the 
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universal, which “directs human history like a puppeteer” – that help to perpetuate 
“the worst stereotypes of Hegel’s philosophy.”81  
And yet, as McGowan stresses, Hegel is himself largely “responsible for much 
of the misunderstanding that surrounds” the Philosophy of History, for he “leads the 
reader unfamiliar with his other work to believe that he sees history as a progressive 
march to a preordained goal achieved only by Christian Europe.”82 “Unfamiliar with 
his other work” is the operative phrase here, which is why, as noted above, 
McGowan contends that the Science of Logic is a necessary prerequisite for 
understanding what, exactly, Hegel is up to in the Philosophy of History. This is 
especially the case when it comes to properly grasping another fundamental 
concept from the Philosophy of History, one which, like the “world-historical 
individual,” doesn’t appear anywhere else in Hegel’s oeuvre, yet which, unlike the 
world-historical individual, doesn’t appear in the selections from the Philosophy of 
History included in Hedge’s anthology: the “end of history.”  
Perhaps no other passage from the Philosophy of History has received more 
attention – much of it negative – than that in which Hegel boldly proclaims that “the 
History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of 
History.”83 While many Hegelians either apologize for or attempt to disavow this 
pronouncement of history’s end, McGowan not only insists on maintaining it, but also 
maintains that it is a “crucial pillar of Hegel’s edifice,” for reaching the end of history 
necessarily entails “the recognition of universal freedom.”84 As McGowan explains, 
contrary to its typical understanding, the end of history for Hegel entails neither the 
cessation of “significant historical events,” nor our ceasing to discover “new avenues 
for the articulation of freedom” (as in the discovery of, say, “some new form of 
communism”).85 Rather, the end of history designates the point at which “freedom 
becomes accessible for all,” with freedom here understood in the precise sense 
discussed above, as the recognition of “the absence of any substantial authority” and 
the subsequent “refusal to treat the Other as a substantial being.”86  
To schematize McGowan’s account of how Hegel arrives at the end of history, 
we might say that the end of history is for Hegel achieved by way of three Events, all 
of which constitute crucial desubstantializations of the Other. The first Event, that 
which stands as the beginning of the end of history, as it were, is the death of Christ 
on the cross, an Event which demonstrates that “even the highest authority 
imaginable, even the infinite authority of God, suffers from the same contradiction 
that besets the lowest subject.” It would take a second Event, however – the 
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Protestant Reformation – to fully realize the radical freedom that this first Event 
entailed. In contrast to Catholicism, which “sustains God’s obscurity for the subject 
and leaves God in a position where divine contradiction does not become evident” (a 
key example of which is the sacrament of Reconciliation, wherein, rather than 
seeking absolution for one’s sins directly from God, one must rely on a priest, who, 
acting in God’s stead, himself prescribes acts of penance), Protestantism “offers 
subjects a direct relation to God.”87 The third Event, that which for Hegel definitively 
brings about the end of history, is the advent of modernity in Europe, an Event which 
“permits every subject to experience this revelation of the inconsistency of authority” 
insofar as “no subject in modernity has any necessary superiority to any other.”88 This 
is why modernity is “the epoch of revolutions” (every one of which, as Domenico 
Losurdo reminds us, from the American Revolution to the French Revolution to the 
Haitian Revolution, Hegel celebrated), for “if there is no undivided Other, no figure of 
authority that avoids contradiction, then no one has a right to rule. As a result, rule 
becomes the object of contestation, and, what’s more, subjects must learn to exist 
without reliance on any consistent external authority whatsoever.”89 The end of history 
is thus for Hegel another means of articulating the fundamental claim from the 
preface to the Phenomenology that substance is also subject. History ends with the 
“subjectivation” of substance, with the realization that substance is non-substantial, a 
realization/desubstantialization that leaves the subject radically – abyssally – free.  
Contrary, then, to the typical complaint that Hegel’s proclamation of the end of 
history signals an “opting out of political struggle,” that it functions as “an escape 
hatch from politics or freedom,” Hegel’s pronouncement of history’s end “assures us 
that we are condemned to freedom, that we cannot turn back to the assurances of a 
consistent authority.”90 As McGowan concludes, “At the end of history, [subjects] must 
give duties to themselves rather than receiving them from an authoritative Other. 
Every subject must wrestle with the self-division of the Other,” with the fact that (in 
Lacanese) the big Other does not exist.91 As we will see, it was, paradoxically, the very 
“Hegelisms he fashioned for himself” in the wake of the Civil War that prevented 
Whitman from grasping this sense of the end of history.92 
 
“Historic Denouements,” or, Whitman’s End of History  
Bruno Bosteels begins a recent essay titled “Hegel in America” by noting that “the 
expression ‘Hegel in America’ should resound with something of the comic 
incongruence associated with [a] title . . . such as Tintin in America.”93 The reason for 
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this incongruence, Bosteels points out, is that though, in the Philosophy of History, 
Hegel designates America “the land of the future,” he at the same time “excludes 
America from the purview of both history and philosophy.”94 Bosteels here refers to 
the following iconic passage from the introduction to the Philosophy of History briefly 
alluded to above:  
 
America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie 
before us, the burden of the World’s History shall reveal itself – perhaps 
in a contest between North and South America. It is a land of desire for 
all those who are weary of the historical lumber-room of old Europe. 
Napoleon is reported to have said: “Cette vieille Europe m’ennuie.” It is 
for America to abandon the ground on which hitherto the History of the 
World has developed itself. What has taken place in the New World up 
to the present time is only an echo of the Old World – the expression of 
a foreign Life; and as a Land of the Future, it has no interest for us here, 
for, as regards History, our concern must be with that which has been 
and that which is. In regard to Philosophy, on the other hand, we have 
to do with that which (strictly speaking) is neither past nor future, but 
with that which is, which has an eternal existence – with Reason; and 
this is quite sufficient to occupy us.95 
 
Bosteels notes that many of Hegel’s readers have identified this ambivalent 
treatment of America as “a fundamental paradox in [his] entire philosophy of history.” 
As Bosteels himself suggests, “the ambiguity of the very expression . . . ‘the land of 
the future’ to designate America sums up a pivotal vacillation on Hegel’s part, as 
though he were not altogether certain that the continent in question could not also 
open up a vista on the spirit’s future,” a future that would “anticipate the possibility of 
an end to the end of history” that Hegel, a mere handful of pages later, will claim has 
already come to pass in Europe.96 
 As the title of his aforementioned political pamphlet Democratic Vistas 
suggests, Whitman had little doubt that America would open up a vista onto the 
spirit’s future. Whereas Hegel had insisted that “prophecy is not the business of the 
philosopher,” for Whitman prophecy was precisely the purview of “the poet of the 
modern,” the “divine literatus” whose works, he insisted, must be “not only possess’d 
of the religious fire and abandon of Isaiah, luxuriant in the epic talent of Homer, or for 
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proud characters as in Shakspeare [sic], but consistent with the Hegelian formulas.”97 
Hegel may have been ambivalent about the role America would play in the unfolding 
of world history, characterizing it as “a Land of the Future” while at the same time 
quarantining it to the past as merely “an echo of the Old World,” but Whitman had no 
doubt that Hegel’s “formulas” were applicable to the American scene, proclaiming at 
the outset of the Carlyle essay that Hegel’s “principle works . . . might not 
inappropriately be this day collected and bound up under the conspicuous title: 
‘Speculations for the use of North America, and the Democracy there, with the 
relations of the same to Metaphysics, including Lessons and Warnings 
(encouragements too, and of the vastest,) from the Old World to the New.’ ”98 The 
encomium to Hegel continues, with Whitman later in the essay crediting his 
philosophy with “providing the most thoroughly American points of view I know” and 
once more hailing his “formulas” as “an essential and crowning justification of New 
World democracy in the creative realms of time and space,” adding that “there is that 
about them which only the vastness, the multiplicity and the vitality of America would 
seem able to comprehend, to give scope and illustration to, or to be fit for, or even 
originate.”99 
As claims such as these suggest, Whitman almost certainly never 
encountered the passage from the Philosophy of History in which Hegel insisted that 
America, as a land of the future, has nothing to do with world history, which has 
already come to an end in Europe.100 And yet, what is so uncanny about Democratic 
Vistas – along with a number of Whitman’s other postbellum texts, including prose 
pieces like the aforementioned “Sunday Evening Lectures” and “Carlyle from an 
American Point of View” and poems like 1865’s “Years of the Modern” and 1871’s 
“Passage to India” – is its casting of America not only as a land of the future, but also, 
precisely because of its role as an envoy of futurity, the end of history.101 More than a 
century prior to Francis Fukuyama’s faux-Hegelian declaration that the unchallenged 
global hegemony of liberal democracy following the Cold War was a sign that 
mankind had reached the end of history, Whitman used Hegel’s “formulas,” as he 
understood them, as a means of buttressing his belief in American democracy as 
“the fervid and tremendous IDEA” destined to “dominate the world” by “melting 
everything else with resistless heat, and solving all lesser and definite distinctions in 
a vast, indefinite, spiritual, emotional power.”102 In passages such as this one from 
Democratic Vistas, Whitman’s understanding of Hegel as a prophet of synthesis 
merges with his understanding of Hegel as a prophet of the end of history. Indeed, 
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Whitman need not have encountered Hegel’s actual proclamation regarding the end 
of history, for the view of Hegel as a thinker of synthesis – a thinker, as Whitman puts 
it in the “Sunday Evening Lectures,” of “unending progress,” one for whom the 
“contradictions and paradoxes of the world and of life” are “a series of infinite 
radiations and waves of the one sea-like universe of divine action and progress, 
never stopping, never hasting” – leads, perforce, to a teleological understanding of 
history.103   
Whereas prior to his encounter with Hegel, Whitman, in poems like “Song of 
Myself,” not only rested content with but even flaunted his penchant for 
contradictions, in his “post-Hegelian” writings, so to speak, he is far more anxious to 
cast himself as a resolver of them. The following passage from the outset of 
Democratic Vistas is exemplary in this regard: “[T]hough it may be open to the 
charge of one part contradicting another – for there are opposite sides to the great 
question of democracy, as to every great question – I feel the parts harmoniously 
blended in my own realization and convictions, and present them to be read only in 
such oneness, each page and each claim and assertion modified and temper’d by 
the others.”104 Such a passage demonstrates that, in the later Whitman, the hallmark 
of the divine literatus’ “consisten[cy] with the Hegelian formulas” is not his ability to 
contradict himself, but to “harmoniously blend” contradictions, to “essentially 
harmonize, satisfy, and put at rest.”105 
To put at rest “History, with all its long train of baffling, contradictory events” is 
precisely the role Whitman envisions America playing throughout Democratic 
Vistas.106 To put a name to it, this role, as Jefferson oxymoronically dubbed it, is that of 
an “empire for liberty.”107 Hence Whitman’s grand vision of America “march[ing] with 
unprecedented strides to empire so colossal, outvying the antique, beyond 
Alexander’s, beyond the proudest sway of Rome.”108 Like charity, empire begins at 
home, as Whitman touts the annexations of Texas, California, and Alaska, the first of 
which he didn’t merely support, but publicly advocated for in his role as editor of the 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle in the mid-1840s.109 In time, however, this empire’s democratic 
vistas, according to Whitman’s vision, would become far more expansive, 
progressing from continental to hemispheric to global, as America would not only 
“reach north for Canada and south for Cuba,” but also seek (as the title of his last 
great poem has it) “passage to India.”110 The continental and hemispheric element of 
this vision is repeatedly emphasized throughout Democratic Vistas, perhaps no more 
forcefully than in the following passage: 
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Long ere the second centennial arrives, there will be some forty to fifty 
great States, among them Canada and Cuba. When the present century 
closes, our population will be sixty or seventy millions. The Pacific will be 
ours, and the Atlantic mainly ours. There will be daily electric 
communication with every part of the globe. What an age! What a land! 
Where, elsewhere, one so great? The individuality of one nation must 
then, as always, lead the world. Can there be any doubt who the leader 
ought to be?111 
 
Published the same year as Democratic Vistas, “Passage to India,” as the following 
lines demonstrate, picks up where the former leaves off, painting an even bolder 
picture of America’s global destiny: 
 
Passage to India! 
Lo, soul, seest thou not God’s purpose from the first?  
The earth to be spann’d, connected by network,  
The races, neighbors, to marry and be given in marriage,  
The oceans to be cross’d, the distant brought near,  
The lands to be welded together.  
 
A worship new I sing, 
You captains, voyagers, explorers, yours, 
You engineers, you architects, machinists, yours, 
You, not for trade or transportation only, 
But in God’s name, and for thy sake O soul. 
 . . . . 
 Struggles of many a captain, tales of many a sailor dead, 
 Over my mood stealing and spreading they come, 
 Like clouds and cloudlets in the unreach’d sky. 
 
All along history, down the slopes, 
 As a rivulet running, sinking now, and now again to the surface rising, 
 A ceaseless thought, a varied train – lo, soul, to thee, thy sight, they rise, 
 The plans, the voyages again, the expeditions; 
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 Again Vasco de Gama sails forth, 
 Again the knowledge gain’d, the mariner’s compass, 
 Lands found and nations born, thou born America, 
 For purpose vast, man’s long probation fill’d, 
 Thou rondure of the world at last accomplish’d.112 
 
As he does in Democratic Vistas, Whitman here casts America as the agent of the 
globe’s “welding,” the nation whose purpose is to bring about, at long last, after “long 
probation,” the end of history, to “accomplish” the “rondure of the world,” or, as he 
puts it in “Years of the Modern,” to bring about “historic denouements.”113 What’s more, 
Whitman also suggests that this end of history is brought about by the cunning of 
reason, a concept which, as we have seen, he would have encountered in the 
excerpts from the Philosophy of History included in Hedge’s anthology. As Whitman 
stresses, all of the individuals who have helped “accomplish” this “rondure of the 
world,” who have helped bring about these “historic denouements” (the captains, 
voyagers, explorers, engineers, architects, machinists), have (unwittingly, 
unconsciously) given their lives “not for trade or transportation only,” but also for the 
“sake” of the “soul” – not merely, or even primarily, Whitman’s own soul, but rather 
what, in Democratic Vistas, Whitman terms the “absolute soul,” a figure which, like 
Emerson’s “Over-soul,” is effectively a “poeticized version of the Hegelian Geist.”114 We 
might thus say that works like Democratic Vistas and “Passage to India” are just as 
much Whitman’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” as they are his “Philosophy of History.” 
And yet, from the vantage point of McGowan’s book, these Whitmanian 
versions of spirit’s phenomenology and history’s “denouement,” regardless of how 
Hegelian Whitman himself believed them to be, fall wide of the Hegelian mark. 
Though it is difficult to imagine McGowan disagreeing more with his understanding 
of Hegel, Thomas Haddox is nonetheless correct when he claims that Whitman’s 
position in Democratic Vistas and other postbellum writings is one that is “all too 
amenable to conservatism and complacency.”115 Rather than confronting “the modern 
abyss of freedom” and “achieving a contradictory revolution,” as McGowan’s Hegel 
prompts us to do, Whitman, paradoxically enough, uses Hegel as a means of 
“fantasiz[ing] a consistent Other,” an Other none other than the Hegelian Spirit itself, 
a concept which Whitman believed to be “convertible” (i.e., interchangeable) with 
“Democracy” and “America.”116 Whereas for McGowan’s Hegel the end of history 
neither signals the end of political struggle, the ushering in of a perpetually post-
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political epoch, nor entails that no new avenues for articulating, no new forms of 
achieving, freedom will be discovered, for Whitman, conversely, democracy – or, as 
he alternately puts it in Democratic Vistas, “liberalism” – is equivalent to, “convertible” 
with, “political liberty,” and for that very reason the agent of the post-political.117 
McGowan is thus more correct than he knows when he claims that Whitman’s 
Hegelianism illustrates the maxim that the greatest threat to a thinker are acolytes 
rather than enemies. Reading Whitman’s post-Hegelian poetry and prose after 
reading McGowan’s book, it is indeed difficult not to pose the proverbial question, 
“With friends like these, who needs enemies?” And yet, Whitman’s Hegel is merely 
symptomatic of the main catastrophes to which Hegel’s work has long been 
subjected.  
As discussed above, McGowan interprets the dialectic as a drama. 
“Catastrophe” is itself a dramatic term, of course, one that connotes the denouement 
of a drama, particularly a tragedy. The Greek strophē (στροφή) means “turning” (from 
strephein [στρέφειν], “to turn”), while the prefix kata (κατα) is typically taken to mean 
“down”; hence the “downturn” that occurs in the final act of a classical tragedy. But 
kata can also be translated as “back” or “over,” in which case katastrophē 
(καταστροφή) can also mean “overturning.” With this meaning of the term in mind, 
perhaps the highest compliment one could pay McGowan’s book is to say that it is 
itself a catastrophe, one that, as the example of Whitman demonstrates, overturns 
more than a century and a half of misreadings, misunderstandings, and misprisions 
of Hegel. In so doing, McGowan not only gives us a Hegel of radical emancipation; 
he also radically emancipates Hegel himself. 
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31 Ibid., 21. 
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33 A key example of this is when, addressing Hegel’s discussion in the Phenomenology of Spirit of “the 
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CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







                                                                                                                                                                                    
34 Ibid., 19. As McGowan explains, “the absolute takes different forms in Hegel’s works, but the point it 
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destined to cover up a traumatic truth” (x). For Cavell on “acknowledgment,” which is simultaneously 
his most central philosophical concept and his most important philosophical contribution, see, for 
instance, “Knowing and Acknowledging,” in Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 238–66. 
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of the 1849 text, was published in Philadelphia in 1854 by Lippincott, Grambo & Co. Given that the 
Lippincott edition is the one with which Whitman would have been familiar, I have chosen to cite this 
edition. 
56 Ibid., 272. Here we would do well to not only repeat McGowan’s aforementioned claim that for Hegel 
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Hegelian reason (Vernunft ) is for McGowan not a faculty that “resolves” contradictions. Rather than 
“lift[ing] the subject above contradiction,” reason for Hegel actually “lowers the subject into the mire of 
contradiction, permitting the subject to identify with what undermines it.” McGowan, Emancipation 
After Hegel, 21, 63.  
57 Whitman’s quoting of Gostwick in the “Sunday Evening Lectures” appears as follows: “To use the 
summing up of Joseph Gost[w]ick whose brief I endorse: ‘The heavens and the earth and all things 
within their compass – all the events of history – the facts of the present and the development of the 
future (such is the doctrine of Hegel) all form a complication, a succession of steps in the one eternal 
process of creative thought.’” Whitman, Notebooks and Unpublished Prose Manuscripts, 2011–12. 
58 Whitman, Poetry and Prose, 896–97. In fairness to Whitman, unlike the “Sunday Morning Lectures,” in 
which he cribs from the Hedge anthology without any acknowledgment, “Carlyle from an American 
Point of View” features a footnote in which Whitman acknowledges that he is “much indebted to J. 
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Lectures” in his lifetime. Had he done so, he may very well have credited Hedge.  
59 I here refer to Whitman’s claim at the conclusion of his comments on Hegel in the Carlyle essay that 
he has been “recounting Hegel a little freely here.” Ibid., 897. 
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and Harold W. Blodgett (New York: Norton, 1973), 274. Michael Moon retains Bradley and Blodgett’s 
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63 Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s America, 480. Important to note here is that Whitman himself spoke of his 
fondness for Hegel in consolatory terms, asserting in the Carlyle essay that Hegel’s “system . . . 
illuminat[es] the thought of the universe, and satisf[ies] the mystery thereof to the human mind, with a 
more consoling scientific assurance than any yet.” Whitman, Poetry and Prose, 896; emphasis added. 
64 Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s America, 480. 
65 Ibid., 254, 449. 
66 Betsy Erkkila, Whitman the Political Poet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 248.  
67
 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 24–25. 
68 There are a handful of exceptions to this rule, the most notable of which are Kathryn V. Lindberg, 
“Whitman’s ‘Convertible Terms’: America, Self, Ideology,” in Theorizing American Literature: Hegel, the 
Sign, and History, ed. Bainard Cowan and Joseph G. Kronick (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1991), 233–68; and J.P. Craig, “Walt Whitman & Hegel,” International Journal of Liberal Arts and 
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insofar as it mostly “ignor[es] the element of negation in the Aufhebung,” but also (correctly) cautions 
that “treatments of the relationship between Hegel and Whitman that rely heavily upon negation may 
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history” was invented by Kojève. 
85 McGowan, Emancipation After Hegel, 138. 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 







                                                                                                                                                                                    
86 Ibid., 137, 136. 
87 Ibid., 143. 
88 Ibid., 136. 
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on Hegel’s Logic or his Phenomenology of Spirit always must undergo the retroactive 
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B. Nisbit (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 171; Whitman, Poetry and Prose, 932, 988. I 
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Vistas, and the Postbellum Politics of Nostalgia,” Walt Whitman Quarterly Review 22, no. 1 (2004): 4. 
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James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1980), 171. This reliance on Kojève misleads 
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